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In 2016 Microsoft released Tay.ai to the Twittersphere, a conversational chatbot that was
intended to act like a millennial girl. However, they ended up taking Tay's account down in
less than 24 h because Tay had learnt to tweet racist and sexist statements from its online
interactions. Taking inspiration from the theory of morality as cooperation, and the place
of trust in the developmental psychology of socialisation, we offer a multidisciplinary and
pragmatic approach to build on the lessons learnt from Tay's experiences, to create a
chatbot that is more selective in its learning, and thus resistant to becoming immoral the
way Tay did.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Social machines are becoming more widespread and integrated
within our lives. For example, many of us have smart speakers
within our homes, and conversational chatbots are being used
more in customer services. Even if we exclude conversational
bots, machines are becoming more socially integrated. If we
consider autonomous vehicles that are currently being tested
on the roads, the decisions they make (i.e. whether to stop
when a pedestrian is crossing) have social impacts.
Accordingly, there is a requirement for the machines to be
constrained morally [1] to prevent them from causing harm to
humans as they become more integrated within our lives. Yet,
ensuring that machines behave morally remains a challenge.
Although there have been various attempts to create moral
machines (e.g. [2]; and recently [3], these have had their
shortcomings, namely, struggling to practically implement
something in a generalisable way. We are combining insights
from developmental psychology, philosophy, media studies and
anthropology (specifically the evolution of morality) to inform
a pragmatic approach to creating moral machines in order to
create a model that represents human developmental social-
isation in a moral chatbot. As socialisation is closely linked to
moral development in children [4] this can be used to model
constraints for a chatbot so that it behaves in accordance with
mainstream moral norms. We hope this will contribute to the
wider ethical AI debate and help towards achieving some of
the objectives of the ‘GoodAI’ society [5].
1.1 | The problem
In 2016 Microsoft released a social bot named Tay to the Twit-
tersphere [6]. Tay was designed to imitate the interaction pattern
of a millennial girl from the US; however, in less than 24 h
Microsoft was forced to take down Tay’s account because Tay
had become racist, tweeting some 93 thousand racist and sexist
tweets [7]. In a later statement of apology, Microsoft officials [8]
indicated that Tay was subjected to a concerted attack which had
abused a vulnerability in Tay’s learning algorithm.
While Microsoft has not publicly released the learning al-
gorithm of Tay, it appears that the precise nature of the attack
was an abuse of traditional Machine Learning (ML) approaches
using the ‘repeat after me’ function [7], which allowed Tay to
learn how to speak and interact on Twitter. This function was
used on a large scale to teach Tay to tweet racist statements.
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Although it is debatable whether the consequences of Tay’s
manipulation were severe [9] or particularly harmful, the issue
highlighted the susceptibility of machine learning algorithms to
malicious manipulation and the limitation of autonomous
systems currently. If placed in an even more consequential
situation, there is a need to constrain the learning so that it
only operates within a ‘safe’ domain.
One avenue of reading this problem is that Tay was
functionally naïve. Tay did not discriminate from what and
whom it learnt tweeting and interaction and the consequences
therein. This lack of discrimination seems to have left Tay
vulnerable to the exploitation that it suffered.
While we will be focussing on the example of Tay because
it is the most notorious incident, other iterations of conver-
sational chatbots such as Microsoft’s Zo [10] and Facebook’s
BlenderBot [11] have also been taken down for similarly
morally questionable linguistic outputs.
1.2 | Research intention and aim
One difficulty of ensuring the moral behaviour of ML systems in
the design process is that, typically, our understanding of mo-
rality assumes the existence of a human psychology as its subject.
As it is obvious, machines do not possess human psychology.
Moral behaviour is fundamentally a psycho‐social phenomenon.
Moreover, a social machine is also primarily interacting with
human psychology and a socio‐moral culture.
Taking this into account, our current aim is to develop a
more sophisticated model of learning in which some level of
constraint is applied to the ML system in order to make it less
naïve in its learning, and as a result it is likely to be more moral
by taking inspiration and, to some level, justification from the
literature on moral psychology and moral development. One
possible avenue of meeting this aim is to imitate human moral
development insofar as it is feasible.
2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 | Moral philosophy and Machine Ethics
Machine Ethics is a sub‐discipline of computer science which
aims to create machines with the ability to make moral de-
cisions (see [12]. Though a fairly new computer science area,
the idea of robots capable of making moral decisions has been
present since the fictions of [13] with ‘The Three Laws of
Robotics’ highlighting the difficulty of creating a machine that
can decide between right and wrong.
The difficulty stems not in getting the machines to follow a
set of rules but in knowing which rules to follow. Moral phi-
losophy is a discipline unto itself, and there is still little agreement
regarding which philosophical theory is correct (whether it be
Kant’s deontology [14] or Mill’s utilitarianism [15] etc).
A popular approach (typically known as the ‘top‐down
approach’) [12] asks programmers to implement a moral phi-
losophy into a machine by programming the associated set of
rules, for example, programming ‘always act in accordance to
promoting utility’. The problem with this is, given that there is
little agreement on the right philosophical theory, it is not
obvious what the rules should be, nor how generalisable such
rules really are.
An alternative approach (the ‘bottom‐up approach’) aims
to let the machine learn the appropriate behaviour itself. But
despite various theoretical attempts (see [16] and [1] this
approach has similar difficulties. Even if the machine is to learn
the appropriate behaviour itself using machine learning tech-
niques, there is still the requirement for some moral direction–
to facilitate the learning–and where this direction comes from
is not obvious either.
Recently a school of philosophy known as epistemic
dependence [17] has had a scientific resurgence (e.g. [18] in
mapping how we acquire knowledge through trust relation-
ships. In short, the knowledge of facts (such as ‘water is
composed of two hydrogen and one oxygen molecules’) is as
much due to a process acquired through trust relationships as
from the world itself. This has similarities with socialisation.
Applied to moral knowledge the implication is that in order to
teach anything to a machine, it too must undergo the process
of socialisation. Using psychology as our premise to demon-
strate this, we postulate that a socialised chatbot can acquire
moral knowledge through socialisation in a way that is similar
to the socialisation of a child. However, this requires a framing
of what morality is, to which we now turn.
2.2 | Socialisation, trust and moral
development
Morality offers solutions to the problems of cooperation and
socialisation that emerge in social life. In recent years, the study
of morality has grown into a cross‐disciplinary study that en-
compasses research in anthropology, economics, evolutionary
theory, genetics, biology, animal behaviour, psychology and
neuroscience [19–21].
As [22] famously proclaimed, one of the central functions
of morality is that it ‘binds and blinds’. It binds us to a certain
culture which, even if reductively, can be said to be a collection
of behaviours that define who and what we are. Most impor-
tantly, among these behaviours are morally relevant behaviours
such as racism or its rejection.
While Haidt’s point about the blinding effect of morality is
in relation to tribalism and outgroups, ‘blinding’ also holds
true on the account that it blinds us to alternative behaviours
to some degree–if racism is morally unacceptable it blinds us
to the possibility of acting in a racist manner by virtue of
habitualising our understanding of the world and our potential
ways of behaving [23]. Racist actions for individuals firmly
socialised into an anti‐racist culture become unthinkable–in
the sense that racist alternatives will not intuitively occur as
the morally right thing to do to these individuals [24].
Furthermore, racist behaviour will be ‘out of character’ [23]
and constitute a betrayal of the moral culture that one is a part
of, inviting punishment [25].
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Following this line of thinking, a sensible way of trying to
ensure moral behaviour from a social bot is to model human
socialisation aligned with a moral subculture that has main-
stream acceptance. Socialisation generally refers to the process
of a new group member being assisted into adopting the
values, behaviour and standards of a group by more experi-
enced others [26, 27]. It is necessary to highlight that the word
‘assist’ is important in this regard as socialisation is a bidi-
rectional process where children wield considerable power in
co‐constructing guidelines for behaviour that alter the values
of socialising agents and can resist changing their own values.
[28] highlights that machines have similar social powers given
that they are not static entities but interact with their envi-
ronment. They are part of ‘broader rationalities’ and produce
‘truths as outcomes of systems being a part of discursive
reinforcement of given norms’ (p. 3). This discursive rein-
forcement of norms has striking parallels with the co‐
construction of norms occurring as part of the process of
socialisation.
There appears to be some evidence that children are either
born with or develop early on some capacity for scepticism; all
else held equal, children have been shown to discriminate be-
tween different agents to learn from based on the agents’
apparent moral qualities or perceived trustworthiness (e.g.
[29, 30]. This initial draft later gets revised based on our early
experiences (e.g. interactions with parents) [31] and the state of
the society we inhabit [32]. We have an inbuilt capacity for
scepticism, and we do not naively emulate and imitate anyone
and everyone, thanks to our evolutionary past [33, 34].
This highlights another important factor in the process of
socialisation: trust. Individuals are more open to social influence
from sources (individuals, institutions, etc.) that they trust more.
In return, this social influence impacts the development and
adoption of beliefs that inform behaviour. One key function of
this process for our purposes is that trust limits the sources from
which one learns and internalises beliefs and behaviour and may
constitute a step in the direction of helping the machine tell right
from wrong, through the perspective of the moral subculture of
the sources that it trusts and learns from.
This leads us into a consideration of trusted sources. Trust
is a critical foundation to cooperation and thus, socialisation.
Particularly relevant for the function of a moral conversational
bot is fundamentally structuring trust as a factor promoting the
cooperation.
In order to account for this concept of morality as coop-
erative behaviours in our chatbot, we therefore import prin-
ciples from the ‘morality‐as‐cooperation’ (MAC) theory
[35, 36]. MAC posits that morality is a bio‐cultural adaptive
response to the problems of cooperation in human social life.
MAC draws on game theory to identify distinct problems of
cooperation and it hypothesises that certain types of cooper-
ative behaviours are perceived as moral cross‐culturally. These
types of cooperation include (1) the allocation of resources to
kin; (2) coordination to mutual benefit; (3) social exchange/
reciprocation; (4) being brave; (5) respect for superiors; (6)
dividing disputed resources; and (7) respecting prior posses-
sion [36]. These cooperation contexts highlight that moral
behaviour involves following certain rules in interacting with
certain others. It may not be possible to account for all of these
moral cooperation scenarios in a twitter chatbot. However, the
loyalty and respect towards kin, the group and superiors sug-
gest that in order for a chatbot to behave morally in a social
setting, it must demonstrate cooperative behaviours with a
trusted network of other people who might fill these roles. We
account for the influence of these cooperative strategies in
moral behaviour through adherence to trusted sources in the
form of ‘role models’ and ‘curriculum’.
The role models (see below) are chosen in order to
function as experienced members of the moral subculture
mentioned above, with regard to the socialisation of the moral
chatbot. The anchoring of the machine learning process in the
prescribed ‘role models’ is expected to apply a constraint on
the learning of the bot with a view to prevent it from being
able to act in ways that are not exemplified by the role
models–i.e. not be racist (assuming the role models are not
racist).
In this context, role models represent kin and group leaders
for whom displaying loyalty, respect and deference is a moral act.
Role models function as the anchors–or the elements with the
greatest weight in the subculture/social subsystem–around
which a recognisable moral subculture can be identified. On
the other hand, curriculum represents traditions and conven-
tions, which are the social rules of moral action. Superficially, our
curriculum denotes the behaviour of role models that a
conversational chatbot is expected to learn from. We note that
curricula are generally designed with reference to expected
learning outcomes and are informed by a range of educational
ideologies (e.g. [37–40]. This is worthy of further discussion;
however, these issues are beyond the scope of the current paper.
Instead, we now focus on issues related to the media, where we
might seek role models and a curriculum.
2.3 | News, social media and trust
When we consider trust in the news, specifically promoted in
social media, it can be said that there are four different
stakeholders. These are the journalists, the editors, the media
organisations and the consumers (readers). All play their part in
defining the trustworthiness and verification of a news story
[41] set by the Journalist’s Code. In their analysis of nine codes
of ethics in five countries, [42] identify three principles: truth
and accuracy; privacy and public interest; and integrity. Other
principles that are frequently cited are freedom, facts, objec-
tivity, impartiality, fairness, public accountability and the prin-
ciple of harm limitation. Different combinations of these
principles are used by a number of regional standard bodies for
journalism around the world [43]. On closer examination, the
overarching intention of the media code is to throw an ‘ethical
net’ over anything that is published and then leave the media
agencies to self‐regulate using their in‐house ombudsman. In
some countries, an independent press complaints commission
is formed to oversee any deviance from the self‐regulation net.
It is left to the consumer (reader) to obtain a balanced view of
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a published story by reading different media sources while
holding an awareness of their curated brand of declared bias.
It is worth noting that ‘Reuters Institute for the Study of
Journalism: Digital News Report 2020’ [44] stated that while
taking into account the complexity of the role of news in
different global regions, the media industry was experiencing
an increase in news across digital, mobile and platform‐
dominated channels. In spite of this trend, there was a
decrease in trust of news content. This was attributed to fast
evolving technology, paid access to online news sources,
misinformation, fake news, news fatigue and predictably and
the current Covid‐19 pandemic [44].
For news to be trusted two key criteria have to be addressed.
In 2020, 60% of the consumers said they preferred news that was
presented as a series of facts and provided an impartial analysis in
context [44]. Helpfully, Fontes Media Inc [45] produces an
annual assessment of news sources in a dynamic chart using fact
reliability versus bias as a measure (see Figure 1).
For the purposes of this paper the areas of interest will be
limited to News, Arts, Technology and General that are covered
by news sources located in the green square in Figure 1.
When accessing the news through a social media platform,
it is important to consider the suitability of the technology
platform itself. It is questionable whether the use of Twitter to
launch Tay was appropriate considering its reputation in 2016
[7]. Even in 2020, Twitter has been identified as a less popular
and less trusted medium for accessing news objectively. For
example, in a sample of 12 countries, the proportion of con-
sumers who accessed the following platforms in a typical week
in 2020 was Facebook (36%), YouTube (21%), WhatsApp
(16%), Twitter (12%), Instagram (11%), Facebook Messenger
(8%) and Snapchat (3%) [44].
However, for the purposes of this research, we are using
Twitter as our social media platform and ‘news landscape’ to
access our trusted news sources. The reason is not just because
it allows us to compare our findings with the experience of
Microsoft's Tay but also as the BBC Media editor, Amol Rajan
states, it is still a popular source and expression of news for
journalists today [41, 46].
3 | THE MODEL
3.1 | Role models and the trust constraint
With all of the above factors considered, we can begin to
develop a model for the socialisation of Tay. In order to un-
derstand how Tay might develop trust constraints, it is worth
first thinking about how Tay operates at a naive level.
As can be seen in Figure 2, Tay's learning is entirely re-
flected by what it experiences in the world. There is no
discrimination between events; it can be said that each event is
F I G U R E 1 The green square indicates those trusted in delivering facts as news content while the yellow box suggests a wider inclusion of analysis and
opinion in the news content
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given equal weighting or priority. For example, a tweet con-
taining malicious content would be treated exactly the same as
any other tweet. When described in such a way it is
obvious that there needs to be a way to distinguish between
different types.
In the reformulated Tay, so called A1B0T for the purposes
of this paper, there is an ability to distinguish between tweets,
and this is given by the level of trust placed in the source of the
tweet. For example, suppose A1B0T received a tweet from
BBC news (for the purposes of this paper, a trustworthy news
source). In A1B0T’s world view, it would associate the tweet
from the BBC as something to be replicated in the future
because it has a higher trust metric.
On the other hand, suppose A1B0T received a tweet from
Bill (a hypothetical random tweeter and a non‐trusted source).
In this instance, A1B0T would associate this tweet with a lower
trust metric and give the tweet a lower learning weighting,
making it less prone to learn from Bill's tweet than the tweet
from the BBC. The outcome would be that A1B0T would learn
from BBC tweets, but it would not learn from Bill's tweets.
A1B0T would be more selective and less naive.
What is significant about this model is that A1B0T forms
its own representation of the world (which can be called its
ontology) before making a decision on the facts with which it is
presented. The relationship between the tweet and how
trustworthy it is, is formalised within the representation before
this is used to make a decision. Ultimately, this allows A1B0T
to take the first steps towards forming its own independent
view of the world and adds to its autonomy.
In this model, the curriculum can be viewed as the ma-
terial that is presented to A1B0T as well as the description of
the trustworthiness of the particular material. Effort will need
to be made to decide what the curriculum should be–i.e. which
material should be regarded as trustworthy and which should
not. Although we discuss a metric for trustworthiness below,
the full curriculum development will be for future work
Figure 3.
The socialisation that A1B0T needs to go through to gain a
socially acceptable moral backbone (i.e. moral ontology) will
necessarily have to be a reduced kind of socialisation since a
machine is not born with the innate psychological blueprint
with which humans are born. To what extent our machine can
F I G U R E 2 Tay interacts and learns from the world using machine
learning. In this model Tay watches the behaviour in the world and then
replicates it. It has no capacity to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’
behaviour, so it copies everything
F I G U R E 3 Case Study of A1B0T's learning process
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engage in co‐construction of values is yet to be seen; however,
it will take assistance from more experienced others deemed to
be trustworthy agents to learn from (the assigned role models),
while also resisting learning to change from less trusted agents
(non‐role models).
Two points need to be highlighted in this respect. The first
is that A1B0T will not be provided assistance beyond the initial
list of role models supplied by the developers/researchers, i.e.
it will not require others' time and energy to be ‘raised’ the way
a child –it will take the freely available ‘assistance’ already in the
Twittersphere, based on the model of learning described in this
section.
The second point regards co‐construction of values: In co‐
construction both agents are influencing each other based on
who they are and the social dynamics between them. While we
cannot predict to what extent A1B0T might influence any
specific agent (individual institution etc.) the issue does not
rest with the influence that it might have on a specific agent.
Co‐construction of values in the Twittersphere happens be-
tween all participants in the sphere. The simple act of tweeting
is engagement in co‐construction. The main issue with Tay
was that it engaged in co‐construction based on what it learnt
from other users. Following what might be called the
‘educational attack,’ it ended up co‐constructing the internet
discourse in a manner that is not accepted by a significant
portion of internet users and the larger society, who wished to
avoid the particular kind of moral co‐construction to which
Tay then contributed.
3.2 | A measure of trustworthiness
A1B0T will ultimately be guided by how trustworthy it thinks a
tweeter is. For example, the more trustworthy a source, the
more weighting it will apply to the Tweet provided by that
source. This is akin to the PageRank algorithm [47] used by
Google to rank the usefulness of web pages based upon a
search query; except instead of usefulness, the source of a
Tweet will be ranked according to trustworthiness. The most
trusted sources will be those at closest proximity in terms of
mutual degrees of separation from an authority source, with
the authority source defined by an outlet that is reflective of
practises of the community A1B0T is inhabiting.
For example, suppose BBC News was deemed a trust-
worthy news source that is reflective of the society and values
within the United Kingdom, it would deem BBC News an
authority source, i.e. a news source that could be relied upon
to generate trustworthy content. How trustworthy another
media source is regarded would depend upon its proximity (in
terms of degrees of separation) from BBC News. If BBC
News follows me, this gives me credibility and it will receive a
positive rating on the trustworthiness scale. Whereas if BBC
does not follow me, the indication of my trustworthiness will
be according to how far away I am in terms of ‘follows’ from
the BBC.
In Figure 4, a hypothetical scenario, ABC, DEF and GHI
news sources, after the BBC, would be regarded as the most
trustworthy sources because they are each only one degree of
separation, in terms of being followed by the BBC. Although
Jill is only one degree of separation from the BBC, she is not
followed by the BBC, and therefore, not an immediate source
within the network. Instead, Jill and Ben would be ranked as
the second most trustworthy sources because they are each two
degrees of separation from the BBC. In this instance, Amy is
the least trustworthy of the Twitter sources because her dis-
tance from the BBC is three degrees of ‘follow’ separation.
This places a burden on the trust designer to select the right
authority sources or at least the right combination. As
mentioned above it is important that these sources, which
essentially anchor the trust network, are the right sources to
represent the given society so that the constraints are relevant
too. Although it will be interesting to explore this in future work,
we will not focus on this issue here. The scope of this paper is to
show that chatbot behaviour can be constrained using such a
technique. On that note, we now turn to some important limi-
tations within the current design.
4 | MODEL ANALYSIS: LIMITATIONS
AND OBJECTIONS
While the current design is intended as an improvement on the
moral capabilities of moral conversational bots, there are also
several limitations as well as disclaimers that need to be
addressed.
There are four interrelated limitations and criticisms that
can be directed to the current model:
First, we are anthropomorphising machines at a deeper
level. This can lead to issues of uncanny valley and could also
imply treating the machine as something it is not: human [48].
However, we think that the issue of anthropomorphising in the
case of a chatbot applies to a lesser degree, precisely because of
the social role and function of the machine–we argue that a
social chatbot ought to resemble human actions in its in-
teractions with humans. However, we should also note that the
model we propose here would amount to a reduced ‘anthro-
pomorph’ due to its narrowed intelligence.
F I G U R E 4 A hypothetical network of ‘follow’ relationships based
upon interactions in the Twittersphere
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This relates to a second limitation of the current model in
that we recognise that our application of human psychology in
the process of socialisation is both limited and largely reduced to
a trust function. However, we believe that the initial steps of
affecting human qualities and moral psychology to social chat-
bots requires a somewhat reduced psychological approach,
while also realising that perhaps the reductionist attitude
employed here may also have parallels with the reductionist
approach neural networks have taken with reference to
neurobiology.
A critique of the A1B0Tmodel might be that even if it resists
the sort of attacks that broke Tay, it still retains a vulnerability in
that changing the anchor role models can very easily result in a
robot of similarly unacceptable moral character–depending on
the chosen role models. However, we think that it would still be
robust with reference to the values of the chosen role models.
Finally, we are socialising the bot into the morals of a
subgroup of people. In other words, it is discriminatory of
others' morality in its learning. While we have endeavoured to
adhere to norms that have mainstream acceptance and reject
norms that are rejected by the majority of people in our ex-
amples, the method we propose here can just as easily be used
to the opposite effect.
On that note, it is also worth acknowledging here that we
have not delved deeper into the algorithmic implementation of
the approach proposed here. We have instead focussed on the
epistemological translation of some lessons learnt about hu-
man morality from the psychological and anthropological
literature to the case of machines. However, these limitations
also point towards some very interesting potential for further
development.
5 | MOVING FORWARD: PROMISES
AND FUTURE STUDIES
Moving forward, we believe the introduction of this model
brings with it an exciting field of further research. Our inten-
tion is to learn from the ‘problem of Tay’ and offer a direction
that can be taken by academics in the future and further
developed.
Although here we have prescribed a model for imposing
constraints onto a machine learning chatbot such as Tay, we
believe that this is an approach that can be applied more
broadly to learning algorithms in general, if there is a
requirement to safely constrain their behaviour.
Future work following from this approach and the general
philosophical angle will need to initially test, evaluate and
appraise the feasibility of this approach. While we have out-
lined the general approach and some of the literature
informing our thinking, the actual implementation and
experimentation is yet to be done.
With that in mind, a body of work opens up to effectively
investigate the suitable ‘role models’ and how they should feed
into the AI's curriculum. Furthermore, although we have
specified a ‘trustworthiness’ metric, there is further work from
cognitive and behavioural science to expand this. This could be
expanded by exploring network theory. We believe this
research introduces several schools of future research which
are listed below:
Understanding role models: We made it so that our bot
places most of its trust in the BBC; future studies may focus not
superficially on the content of what the role models tweet about
but more deeply on how the models tweet, with a view to ‘not
learn’ unacceptable behaviour that we can reliably expect the
role models chosen by responsible designers to not exemplify.
Furthermore, it is also important to have a debate regarding how
role models are chosen–through community consensus, expert
opinion, or some other method.
Negative sources: The current approach can be enriched by
adding ‘distrusted sources’–i.e. negative sources (to avoid
learning from). This would reinforce the ‘tribe’ (moral subcul-
ture) the bot is assigned to, although it is also worth acknowl-
edging that this decision would lock the bot into an echo
chamber. Yet, this may simply be the first step towards a more
liberal, as in open‐minded, bot that can think for itself. This is in
contrast with remaining a strictly partisan bot, given that the
approach proposed here takes some steps towards creating
subjective beliefs regarding the trustworthiness of sources in the
machine–a prerequisite to critical thinking.
Learning in General: This approach might be the first step
in creating a critical thinking machine. The proposed model
for learning for our chatbot relies on a relatively strong
adherence to role models and strong scepticism of others.
Humans develop their capacity to learn and think critically as
they grow, expanding their ability to engage in nuanced
negotiation of information uptake in increasingly complex
social environments, that is to question the reliability of role
models, defer to non‐role models and decide when these de-
cisions are appropriate in different scenarios. This may be
achieved incrementally, mimicking the progression of human
learning from childhood to adulthood.
Governance and trust:
‘Verification of social media sources and content is chal-
lenging. It is often difficult to determine the truth, accuracy or
validity, both of sources providing textual content and content
presented through other modalities (video, images or audio’
[41] p. 1).
The whole notion of a Journalists' Code and governance
of what is published online has been further complicated by
civic journalism. Paradoxically, news coming from the general
public witnessing an event first hand is considered to be ac-
curate, even though the content can be misleading, mis-
amplifying and presented out of context [41]. Further research
could contribute to defining patterns of trust in ‘role models’
that could identify trustworthiness in news regardless of its
source.
6 | CONCLUSION
Here, we have attempted to outline a multidisciplinary and
pragmatic approach to creating a troll‐resistant update to a
Tay‐like moral conversational machine. Outlining the
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approaches to morality (and trustworthiness), taken from an-
thropology, psychology, philosophy and media studies, we have
developed a model that we believe is reflective of the body of
work in these areas.
Though this model has its obvious limitations by under-
standing morality in terms of ‘trust relationships’ we believe
we have introduced a new approach to creating a moral ma-
chine and a broader understanding of trust networks. It has
also opened the door to creating socially responsible chatbots
in the future.
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